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IMMIGRATION LAW 
ARGUETA v. IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE: 
"NEUTRALITY" AS A POLITICAL OPINION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Argueta v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, l the 
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that, under the Immigration-and-Na-
tionality Act,2 the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard 
of proof required for asylum was more generous than the "clear 
probability of persecution" standard required for withholding of 
deportation.8 The court further held that under either standard, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was incorrect in find-
ing that because Argueta had not demonstrated allegiance to a 
particular political faction he had not established a fear of polit-
ically motivated persecution.· 
II. FACTS 
Argueta, a citizen of EI Salvador, was threatened in his 
home by four members of the "Squadron of Death" who accused 
him of being a member of the Frente Popular de Liberation 
(FPL),II a guerrilla organization.' The squadron members stated 
1. 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were Tuttle, 
J., Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation, 
and Poole, J., dissenting). 
2. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 166 (1952) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101·1557 (1982». 
3. 759 F.2d at 1396·97. 
4. [d. at 1397. 
5. Translated from Spanish, this stands for "The Popular Front for Liberation." 
6. [d. at 1395·96. The "Squadron of Death" was identified as a rightist group in El 
Salvador whom Argueta testified he could identify because they drove red Land Rovers. 
171 
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that if he did not leave the country he would disappear because 
he was the "next one."7 The following day, a close friend of 
Argueta was taken from his home by the same men who had 
previously threatened Argueta.8 Later, Argueta discovered his 
friend's tortured body.9 Argueta left EI Salvador the next day 
and entered the United States on approximately September 26, 
1982.10 On September 28, 1982, deportation proceedings were in-
stituted against him. 11 
At the deportation hearing, Argueta conceded his de-
portability, but filed an application for political asylum and 
withholding of deportation. HI In his application, Argueta argued 
that if he were returned to EI Salvador, he would be persecuted 
because of his political opinion.13 The Immigration Court denied 
the petitions because it found that his testimony lacked credibil-
ity.a Argueta appealed to the BIA alleging that the burden of 
proof had been met. III The BIA affirmed the Immigration 
Judge's decision and held that, even assuming that the testi-
[d. 
7. [d. at 1395. 
8. [d. at 1396. 
9. [d. 
10. [d. at 1395-96. 
11. [d. at 1395. 
12. [d. Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b), asylum requests made after the institution of 
deportation proceedings are also treated as requests for withholding of deportation. 8 
C.F.R. § 208.3(b)(1985). A prerequisite under the Immigration and Nationality Act for 
both asylum and withholding is that the petitioner be physically present in the United 
States or at a "land border or port of entry." INA §§ 208(a), 243(h), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 
1253(h)(1982). 
13. 759 F.2d at 1397. 
14. [d. at 1396-97. The Ninth Circuit cited errors in the Immigration Judge's find-
ings. The Judge stated that Argueta was not specific in regard to the source of the dan-
ger. The court found that Argueta had testified that he could in fact identify the individ-
uals who had killed his brother-in-law as the death squad because they drove red Land 
Rovers. [d. Argueta admitted that he could not identify them individually, but believed 
they were the same people who had threatened him the day before his brother-in-law 
was killed. [d. The Judge found that Argueta had been threatened the day after his 
brother-in-law was killed. The court stated that Argueta had in fact testified that he was 
threatened on the day before the killing. [d. The Judge stated that Argueta had testified 
that the killing of his brother-in-law had not affected him. The court found that Argueta 
testified that he believed the death would affect him because on the day before the kill-
ing, he had been threatened and accused of being a member of the FPL. [d. The Judge 
found that Argueta had testified that the individuals who threatened him merely accused 
him of being in "a guerrilla organization." In fact, the court found Argueta's testimony 
was that he was accused of being a member of the FPL. [d. 
15. [d. at 1396. The decisions of the Immigration Judge in deportation cases are first 
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(b) (1985). 
2
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mony was credible, he had not established either a clear 
probability or a well-founded fear of persecution sufficient to be 
entitled to relief from deportation. IS Argueta appealed the 
Board's order to the Ninth Circuit for review of that decision.17 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
Congress's attempt to organize the various laws relating to 
immigration, naturalization and nationality under one compre-
hensive statute was effectuated by its adoption of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act in 1952.18 Inter alia, that act had the 
effect of eliminating race as a bar to immigration, preventing 
separation of families, introducing a system of selective immi-
gration which gave preference to skilled aliens needed in this 
country, broadening the grounds of exclusion, and safeguarding 
judicial review.19 This new statutory organization did not see 
any major change until 1980. 
In 1980, the Refugee Act20 was promulgated to amend the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. This amendment came about 
in order to put the United States in conformance with the 
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.21 
The Protocol, a multilateral treaty to which the United States 
16. 759 F.2d at 1396. 
17. [d. Appeal from a BIA decision may be reviewed by the Attorney General. 8 
C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1985). A petition for review of the BIA's decision shall be made to the 
judicial circuit in which the administrative proceedings were conducted. 8 U.S.C. 
1105(a)(2) (1982). 
18. Pub. L. No. 414, Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 166 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
ll§ 1101-1557 (1982)). 
19. H. REP. No. 1365, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. 
NEWS 1653, 1677-79. 
20. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
21. The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees bound its signa-
tories to comply with Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees. 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The Convention accorded protection 
to those who had become refugees as a result of events occurring prior to 1951. The 
United States was not a party to the Convention but became bound by those ideals upon 
signing the Protocol. In essence, the Protocol only removed the 1951 deadline and 
adopted the Convention de novo. See S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4, reprinted 
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 141-44; H.R. CONY. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 19, 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 160, 161. See also Note, The 
Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125, 1126 n.5 (1980) for 
further history of the Protocol and Convention. 
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acceded in 1968, provided that equal status be accorded to all 
refugees.la 
The congressional policy underlying the Refugee Act of 1980 
was to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to perse-
cution in their homelands, to provide a procedure for the admis-
sion to this country of refugees, and to establish provisions for 
the effective resettlement of those admitted. lIS The Refugee Act 
made it possible for those aliens present in the United States to 
be eligible for refugee status if they feared persecution in their 
native country on account of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.2' 
Refugee status is a prerequisite to eligibility for asylum re-
lief from deportation under the Immigation and Nationality Act 
(INA) section 208(a).111 After deportation has been initiated, the 
essential difference between asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion under INA section 243(h) is the burden of proof require-
ments. If a refugee demonstrates a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion, asylum may be granted at the discretion of the Attorney 
General.18 On the other hand, withholding of deportation is 
mandatory if the petitioner can show a clear probability of per-
secution based on one of the five grounds enumerated above.27 
22. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 2684968. See also Immigration 
and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 2499 n.20 (1984). 
23. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
24.Id. 
25. Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act reads in part: 
'[Rjefugee' means any person who is outside any country of 
such person's nationality ... and who is unable or unwilling 
to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group or political opinion .... 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982). 
26. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a). In pertinent part, section 208(a) of 
the INA states that the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum if the petitioner 
establishes that he is a refugee within the meaning of § 101(a)(42)(A). Id.; 8 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1158(a) (1982). 
27. Immigration and Nationality Act section 243(h) states in part: 
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien 
. . . to a country if the Attorney General determines that such 
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion. (emphasis added). 
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B. CASE LAW 
These two standards of proof were further clarified by the 
Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. 
Stevie. 28 Stevie argued to the Court that he was entitled to with-
holding of deportation under INA section 243(h) upon establish-
ing a well-founded fear of persecution.29 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed and held that the well-founded fear standard was 
applicable to asylum relief but not to withholding of deportation 
claims. so The Court stated that the "clear probability" standard 
required under INA section 243(h), was satisfied if it were more 
likely than not that the alien would be persecuted upon return 
to the subject country. SI 
In Stevie, the Supreme Court did not offer a definition for 
the term "well-founded fear of persecution" but it did state that 
"For purposes of our analysis, we may assume, as the Court of 
Appeals concluded, that the well-founded-fear standard is more 
generous than the clear-probability-of-persecution standard 
•••• "S2 Since the Stevie decision in 1984, several circuits, in-
cluding the Ninth Circuit, have interpreted the well-founded 
fear of persecution standard as being more liberal than the clear 
probability standard. ss 
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(l) (1982). 
28. 104 S.Ct. 2489 (1984). Stevie, a Yugoslavian, became active in an anti-Commu-
nist organization in the United States. His father-in-law had been jailed in Yugoslavia 
because of membership in the same organization. Stevie, fearing imprisonment were he 
forced to return home, sought withholding of deportation relief under INA section 
243(h). Id. at 2490-91. 
29. Id. at 2497. 
30. Id. at 2497 n.18. 
31. Id. at 2498. 
32.Id. 
33. See, e.g., Young v. United States Department of Justice, 759 F.2d 450, 456 (5th 
Cir. 1985); Youkhanna v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th 
Cir. 1984); Dally v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 744 F.2d 1191, 1196 n.6 (6th 
Cir. 1984); Carvajal-Munoz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 743 F.2d 562, 575 
(7th Cir. 1984). In Young, the Fifth Circuit found the clear probability standard to be 
strict and the well-founded fear standard to be possibly more liberal. 759 F.2d at 456. 
The Sixth Circuit court in Dally, stated that, like Stevie, though not sub justice, the 
petitioners requests for asylum made after the institution of deportation proceedings 
would be judged under the clear probability standard applicable to requests pursuant to 
section 243(h). 744 F.2d at 1196 n.6. The court's reasoning for this interpretation was 
based on 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) which states, in part, that requests for asylum made after 
the institution of deportation proceedings shall also be considered as requests for with-
holding of deportation pursuant to section 243(h) of the INA. (See supra note 11.) This 
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In Zepeda-Melendez v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service,S. the Ninth Circuit recognized that the petitioner's 
home in EI Salvador was in a strategic location for the guerrillas 
and government troops, both of which repeatedly used the 
home's facilities and requested that it be used to store muni-
tions. SII Before munitions had been brought to his house, Zepeda 
left EI Salvador and sought asylum in the United States.36 He 
asserted that his position would be grounds for persecution if he 
were forced to return to EI Salvador.s7 The court stated that 
even if Zepeda faced danger because of his neutrality, this posi-
tion was not dissimilar from that of any other Salvadoran. The 
court held that these facts were not sufficient to support a claim 
of mandatory withholding of deportation. S6 
The Ninth Circuit was soon faced with the question of de-
ciding whether neutrality was a political opinion. In Bolanos-
Hernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,s9 the 
petitioner, an EI Salvadoran, had been in the army, a member of 
is an interesting interpretation in light of Stevie which stated in a footnote that 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.3(b) "simply does not speak to the burden of proof issue; rather, it merely elimi-
nates the need for filing a separate request for section 243(h) relief if a section 208(a) 
claim has been made." 104 S.Ct. at 2497 n.18. 
The Sixth Circuit, in Youkhanna, later held that the well-founded fear standard 
required less than the clear probability standard applied to section 243(h) relief. 749 
F.2d at 362. It is not clear from the facts why Youkhanna was decided differently than 
the dicta in Dally indicated the Sixth Circuit might decide. The Sixth Circuit either 
adopted the Supreme Court's interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) or it has not yet defin-
itively decided the issue. 
The Seventh Circuit, in Carvajal-Munoz, stated that establishing an entitlement to 
withholding of deportation should require a greater evidentiary burden than establishing 
discretionary relief under INA section 208(a). 743 F.2d at 575. The court felt that "clear 
probability" was a heavier burden than that required under a well-founded fear of perse-
cution standard. Id. at 575-76. 
But see Sankar v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 757 F.2d 532, 533 (3rd. 
Cir. 1985). In Sankar, the Third Circuit held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion 
when it equated a well-founded fear with a clear probability of persecution because the 
Third Circuit had unequivocally done so in the past. Id. at 533. The court held that 
Stevie had not defined the term "well-founded fear of persecution" and thus found that 
Stevie did not overrule the Third Circuit's earlier precedents. 757 F.2d at 533 (citing 
Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982); Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 
129, 133 (3d Cir. 1983), eert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3553 (1984». 
34. 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984). 
35. Id. at 287. 
36.ld. 
37.ld. 
38. Id. at 290. 
39. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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a right wing political party, and a member of a civilian police 
squad which acted for the government.·o At his deportation 
hearing, Bolanos testified that the guerrillas believed that his 
knowledge and experience would be useful in their plans to infil-
trate the government.41 Upon his refusal to join the guerrillas, 
Bolanos was told that if he did not leave the country he would 
be killed. Shortly thereafter, he fled the country.·2 The court 
found that his actions indicated that Bolanos consciously chose 
to remain neutra1.43 The Ninth Circuit held that Bolanos's 
choice to remain neutral was no less a political decision than a 
choice to affiliate with a particular political faction.·· The court 
stated that the petitioner's underlying reasons for a political 
choice were of no significance for purposes of sections 208(a) and 
:l43(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the govern-
ment could not inquire into them.·11 Since Bolanos was aware of 
the contending political forces and affirmatively chose not to 
join any faction, his choice was a political one.·6 
Further, the court decided that the assumption in Stevie 
was correct and held the well-founded fear standard to be "more 
generous" than the clear probability test.·7 Under these circum-
stances, the Ninth Circuit found that Bolanos had shown a clear 
probability that he would be subject to persecution if he were 
returned to EI Salvador.48 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY 
The court reviewed the findings of fact made by the BIA 
using the substantial evidence test as required under Bolanos-
Hernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service and 
Zepeda-Melendez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service!9 
40. Id. at 1280. 
41. Id. 
42.Id. 
43.Id. 
44. Id. at 1286. 
45. Id. at 1287. 
46. Id. at 1286-87. 
47. Id. at 1282. 
48. Id. at 1288. 
49. 759 F.2d at 1397 (citing Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 1984); Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1984». Factual findings 
under II 243(h) are subject to review under the substantial evidence test. 
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It reaffirmed the earlier ruling in Bolanos that the well~founded 
fear of persecution standard is more generous than the clear 
probability of persecution standard. llo 
The court analogized the facts in Argueta to the facts in 
Bolanos and relied on that case's holding to determine that 
Argueta had a well~founded fear or a clear probability of perse~ 
cution.1I1 The court pointed out that the facts which established 
withholding or asylum relief from deportation for Bolanos ex~ 
isted in Argueta's case as well.1I2 Both petitioners had chosen to 
remain politically neutral even after being threatened with 
death.1I3 Both petitioners knew that the individuals who had 
threatened them had killed their friends or relatives shortly 
before or after petitioners' own lives were threatened.M This fac~ 
tor demonstrated to the courts that those who made the threats 
to the petitioners had the will and ability to carry them out, 
thus making the petitioners' fears of persecution well-founded.1I1I 
Next, the court reversed the BIA's finding that, even assum-
ing that Argueta's evidence was credible, it was insufficient to 
establish either a well-founded fear or a clear probability of per-
secution.1I6 Assuming credibility, as the BIA had, the Ninth Cir-
50. 759 F.2d at 1396·97. This holding was later quantified in Cardoza-Fonseca v. 
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985). 
Having already determined in Argueta and Bolanos that the standards for withholding 
of deportation and asylum relief were not the aame, the court went further to clarify the 
distinction: 
There is B significant practical consequence to the fact that 
different analyses are required under the two standards. The 
term "clear probability" requires a showing that there is a 
greater-than-fifty-percent chance of persecution. In contrast, 
the term "well-founded fear" requires that (1) the alien have a 
subjective fear, Bnd (2) that this fear have enough of a basis 
that it can be considered well-founded. While in the latter 
case there must be some objective basis for the fear, contrary 
to the requirement of the "clear probability" test, the likeli-
hood of persecution need not be· greater than fifty percent. 
767 F.2d at 1452-53. 
51. 759 F.2d at 1397. 
52. [d. 
53. [d. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. [d. The BIA found it credible that Argueta had been threatened for his alleged 
involvement in the guerrilla organization and that the next day his friend had been tor-
tured and murdered by the same group of individuals whom he could identify as the 
"death squad." [d. at 1395-96. 
8
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cuit found that Argueta had established a clear probability and/ 
or a well-founded fear of persecution. 57 
The court found that Argueta's testimony did establish a 
political opinion even though he was not aligned with either po-
litical faction in EI Salvador. 58 He had affirmatively chosen to 
remain politically neutral, which constituted an expression of 
political opinion under sections 208(a) and 243(h) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, as interpreted by Bolanos.59 
The majority held that their review was limited solely to the 
credibility findings made by the BIA, not to findings made by 
the Immigration Judge.60 The BIA had chosen to accept all the 
evidence offered by Argueta as true, disregarding the Immigra-
tion Judge's findings to the contrary.61 Therefore the BIA could 
not deny Argueta's petitions on the ground that he had failed to 
meet his burden of proof.62 The case was remanded to the BIA 
to make credibility findings necessary to determine Argueta's 
entitlement to withholding or asylum relief.63 
B. DISSENT 
In dissent, Judge Poole stated that the majority's conclusion 
was erroneous because it had adopted findings of fact different 
57. [d. at 1397. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. In Hernandez-Ortiz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 777 F.2d 509 
(9th Cir. 1985), decided after Argueta, the court held that, for persecution on account of 
political opinion, an alien's neutral or partisan political views are irrelevant. [d. at 517. 
The petitioner must establish a prima facie case of potential persecution because of the 
government's belief about the alien's views or loyalties. [d. The court stressed that the 
victim need not possess any political opinion. [d. (citing Argueta, 759 F.2d at 1397). 
In Argueta, the potential persecutors were members of a right-wing political group, 
not the government. 759 F.2d at 1396. This discrepancy would be distinguishable but for 
the fact that persecution by non-government groups is recognized as persecution for pur-
poses of INA §§ 208(a) and 243(h) where the government tolerates or is unable to control 
that group. McMullan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 608 F.2d 1312, 1315 
(9th Cir. 1981). See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status D65 (1979) (regarding agents 
of persecution). 
60. 759 F.2d at 1398 nA. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 1397. 
63. [d. at 1397-98. 
9
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than those found by the Immigration Judge.s4 In so doing, the 
majority controverted Zepeda-Melendez v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service,s5 where the court held that the Immi-
gration Judge's findings of fact must be upheld if supported by 
substantial evidence.ss The dissent stressed that the Immigra-
tion Judge's findings must be given deference here as those con-
clusions were supported by the record.67 
In a footnote, the majority defended their holding.s8 They 
explained that the court's review was limited to the BIA's credi-
bility findings.s9 Because the BIA had accepted Argueta's evi-
dence as true, despite the Immigration Judge's findings, it was 
then erroneous for the BIA to conclude that Argueta had not 
met his burden of proof.70 
The dissent further argued that the facts in this case were 
identical to those in Zepeda. There, the petitioner had alleged 
that his lack of commitment to either political faction consti-
tuted a valid basis for a well-founded fear of persecution.71 The 
Ninth Circuit held that this did not constitute sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate that Zepeda could expect to be persecuted 
if returned to EI Salvador.72 Judge Poole urged that the holding 
in Argueta clearly violated this precedent.78 
V. CRITIQUE 
It is noteworthy that the Argueta dissent addressed the 
holding in Zepeda-Melendez v. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service,74 but that it was not discussed in the majority 
opinion.7Ii In both cases the petitioners asserted that their neu-
64. Id. at 1398. The majority had taken Argueta's evidence as true (as the BIA had) 
whereas the Immigration Judge had found that Argueta's evidence lacked credibility. 
65. 741 F.2d at 289. 
66.Id. 
67. 759 F.2d at 1398. 
68. Id. at 1398 nA. 
69.Id. 
70. Id. at 1398. 
71. 741 F.2d at 289·90. 
72. Id. at 290. 
73. 759 F.2d at 1398. 
74. 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1985). 
75. 759 F.2d at 1395·98. 
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trality attracted the attention of political partisans, giving rise 
to a fear of political persecution.7s The Argueta dissent ne-
glected to note that only Argueta provided evidence that his life 
in particular had been threatened because of his choice to re-
'main neutral." The majority found that the threat had been 
made by those who had the ability to carry it out, and thus that 
Argueta had substantiated his fear of persecution with articul-
able evidence.78 The clear distinction between the facts in 
Zepeda and those in Argueta is that Zepeda had not been 
threatened by either of his potential persecutors and yet as-
serted that he would be subject to persecution by both sides if 
forced to return to EI Salvador.79 
An analysis of the facts and law of Argueta and Zepeda 
leads to the conclusion that credible, individualized evidence of 
incidents of direct threats of persecution, made by those with 
the will and ability to carry them out, can lead to a finding that 
the petitioner has a well-founded fear,or that there is a clear 
probability, of persecution. Argueta suggests that holding a neu-
tral political opinion when faced with threats of violence can be 
a basis for the fear of persecution. 
In this case, evidence that a member of Argueta's family 
had been physically persecuted was significant to the court.80 By 
itself, this would not necessarily be outcome determinative. Evi-
dence of fear of persecution, considered cumulatively with evi-
dence of a number of threats or acts of violence against an 
alien's family members, is weighed heavily to support a claim 
that the alien's life or freedom would be endangered in his home 
country.81 
76. [d. at 1397; Zepeda, 741 F.2d at 289-90. 
77. 759 F.2d at 1398. 
78. [d. at 1397. 
79. See Zepeda, 741 F.2d at 287. Recent cases have suggested that evidence of a 
threat to the petitioner may support a claim of potential persecution. See, e.g., Ananeh-
Firempong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 766 F.2d 621, 627 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(alien seeking INA § 243(h) relief required to show a real threat of individual persecu-
tion) and Espinoza-Martinez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 754 F.2d 1536, 
1540 n.l (9th Cir. 1985) (expressly distinguishing Bolanos because no threat was made to 
petitioner). 
80. 759 F.2d at 1397. 
81. Hernandez-Ortiz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 777 F.2d 509, 515 
(9th Cir. 1985). See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 1153 (1979) (cumulative 
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United States political philosophies regarding a petitioner's 
country of origin are not an explicit consideration when granting 
asylum. The Refugee Act of 1980 removed language from the 
statutes which had indicated the United States' willingness to 
protect aliens fleeing from a Communist-dominated country.82 
Though the current statutes do not make reference to the 
United States' political ideologies, the number of asylum cases 
granted from EI Salvador, as opposed to Poland or Iran, may 
reflect the present as well as past political policies of the govern-
ment.83 If generally adopted, the Argueta decision to recognize 
the petitioner's neutrality as a political opinion could allow more 
successful asylum claims from volatile countries whose govern-
ments are supported by the United States. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the meaning of politi-
cal persecution within the Immigration and Nationality Act is 
without precedent in other circuits. In Zepeda-Melendez v. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, the court seemed to re-
ject the theory that maintaining a neutral political opinion was 
evidentiary grounds to demonstrate a well-founded fear or a 
clear probability of persecution. The court, in deciding Argueta, 
has now indicated that such a theory is viable. It appears that 
political neutrality itself cannot open the doors to deportation 
relief but must be substantiated by credible evidence demon-
strating a direct and personal threat of persecution. 
In light of the more recent Ninth Circuit holding in Her-
nandez-Ortiz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, which 
expanded the term "political opinion" to mean the political 
opinion the government believes the petitioner holds, neutrality 
may be of only minor importance.84 The finding of neutrality as 
a political opinion is clearly a view worth expanding in circuits 
grounds for well-founded fear of persecution possible). 
82. B. HING. HANDLING IMMIGRATION CASES 224 (1985). 
83. From El Salvador, 129 petitioners have been granted and 2,299 have been de· 
nied asylum in the INS fiscal year 1985 to September 1985. From Poland, 549 were 
granted and 737 were denied asylum. The cases from Iran are more compelling, 4,087 
petitions granted and 2,400 denied asylum. Immigration and Naturalization Service: 
Asylum Cases Filed With District Directors, Fiscal Year 1985, to September 1985. 
84. 777 F.2d at 517. 
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which have yet to reach such an interpretation or are more con-
servative than the Ninth Circuit in their approach to immigra-
tion cases. 
Maureen A. Monaghan* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986 
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RICHARDS v. SECRETARY OF STATE: 
SPECIFIC INTENT AS AN INTEGRAL 
PART OF AN EXPATRIATING ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Richards v. Secretary of State, l the Ninth Circuit held 
that a United States national had expatriated himself when he 
was naturalized in Canada and took an oath of allegiance in 
which he explicitly renounced his United States citizenship/I 
II. FACTS 
Appellant William Anthony Richards was born a United 
States citizen in 1938 at San Luis Obispo, California. In 1965, he 
moved to Canada where he established residence. He taught 
school until 1969, at which time he applied for a job with the 
Boy Scouts of Canada. The Boy Scouts required that employees 
either be Canadian citizens or have declared an intention of ac-
quiring Canadian citizenship upon becoming eligible. Richards 
applied for Canadian citizenship and it was granted on February 
23, 1971.3 
1. 752 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Reinhardt, J.; the other panel members were 
Hug, J., and Panner, D.J., United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting 
by designation). 
2. 1d. at 1423. The court affirmed the holding of the district court that appellant 
Richards was not a citizen of the United States. 1d. The opinion of the district court is 
unpublished. Richards v. Secretary of State, No. CV-4150-TJH(G) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 
1982) (per Hatter, J.). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) which provides, in relevant part, that: 
[AJ national of the United States whether by birth or naturali-
zation, shall lose his nationality by (1) obtaining naturaliza-
tion in a foreign state upon his own application ... or (2) 
taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal decla-
ration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision 
thereof .... 
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1982). 
3. 752 F.2d at 1416. On February 23, 1971, Richards signed the following Declara-
tion of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance: 
I hereby renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign 
sovereign or state of whom I may at this time be a subject or 
185 
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The following year, Richards traveled to California on a Ca-
nadian passport and registered for graduate study as a foreign 
student. In 1973 he returned to Canada where he taught school 
until 1975, afterwards taking up a career as a freelance writer 
and trail guide. He married a Canadian citizen in 1976. United 
States officials first learned of Richards's naturalization in Ca-
nada later that year, when he went to the United States Consu-
late to obtain visas for his wife and her children. Upon inquiry, 
Canada confirmed that Richards had been naturalized. The 
Consulate prepared a Certificate of Loss of Nationality and for-
warded it to the United States Department of State for ap-
proval. The State Department relayed instructions concerning 
certain preliminary procedures, but when the Consulate was un-
able to locate Richards in order to comply with these instruc-
tions, his case was retired to inactive status. 
In December of 1977, Richards visited the Consulate to in-
quire about his citizenship status. Basing its decision upon ques-
tionnaires which Richards completed at that time, and on an in-
terview he had with a consular official, the Consulate notified 
the State Department that he had lost his United States citizen-
ship.· On June 22, 1978, the State Department issued the Certif-
icate of Loss of Nationality and delivered it to Richards, who 
was then in California. 
Richards appealed his loss of citizenship to the State De-
partment's Board of Review. The Board concluded he had re-
nounced his United States citizenship. II Richards then filed suit 
[d. 
citizen. I swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance 
to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her heirs and 
successors, according to law, and that I will faithfully observe 
the laws of Canada and fulfill my duties as a Canadian citizen 
so help me God. 
4. [d. at 1417. The opinion does not relate the'specific basis for the Consulate's 
decision. A questionnaire which Richards completed and signed under oath at the Con-
sulate in 1976 formed part of the record of the de novo trial in district court. That court 
reached the same conclusion as the State Department. An answer to the questionnaire 
states: "At the time I was an employee of the Boy Scouts of Canada and felt I should 
become a citizen of Canada. I did not [sic) want to relinquish my U.S. citizenship but as 
part of the Canadian citizenship requirements did so." [d. at 1422. 
5. [d. at 1417. The three issues Richards raised in this appeal were raised again in 
the suit he subsequently instituted in district court. The Board declined to consider 
Richards's constitutional arguments, for lack of jurisdiction, and it rejected his other 
arguments. [d. 
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in district court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a),6 seeking declara-
tions that the procedures used by the State Department in issu-
ing the Certificate violated the due process, equal protection, 
and bill of attainder clauses of the Constitution, and that he was 
a United States citizen. The lower court declined to reach the 
constitutional claims, finding that a trial de novo to determine 
Richards' citizenship status would provide him full relief.7 As a 
result of that trial, the court concluded that Richards had lost 
his United States citizenship.8 Richards appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit. 
III. BACKGROUND 
Changes in theory and application have significantly altered 
United States expatriation law within the past few decades.9 In 
1958, the Supreme Court held in Perez v. BrownelPo that au-
thority to strip a United States citizen of that citizenship was 
encompassed in the implied congressional power to conduct the 
nation's foreign affairs.ll Eleven years later, in Afroyim v. 
6. Section 1503(a), in relevant part, confers a cause of action upon a person within 
the United States, who has been denied a right or privilege of United States citizenship 
by a United States government department or agency on the ground that he is not a 
national of the United States. Such person may bring a suit against the head of the 
government department or agency for a declaratory judgment. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (1982). 
7. 752 F.2d at 1417 (referring to Richards v. Secretary of State, No. CV-4150-
TJH(G) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1982)). 
8. [d. Finding that Richards had voluntarily performed the expatriating acts, the 
district court stated: "[P)laintiff would have preferred to retain American citizenship, 
and in his mind hoped to do so, but elected to sign the Canadian naturalization docu-
ments and accept the legal consequences thereof rather than risk loss of his job or career 
advancement." The court also found that Richards's intent to renounce his U.S. citizen-
ship was "established by his knowing and voluntary taking of the oath of allegiance to a 
foreign sovereign which included an explicit renunciation of his United States citizen-
ship." [d. at 1421 (quoting Richards v. Secretary of State, No. CV-4150-TJH(G) (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 9, 1982)). 
9. For discussions of the historical development of expatriation law in the United 
States prior to 1958, see generally, Duvall, Expatriation Under United States Law, Pe-
rez to Afroyim: The Search for a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VA. L. REV. 
408,411-20 (1970); Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate 
American Citizens, 53 GEO. L. J. 315, 317-26 (1965). 
10. 356 U.S. 44 (1958). 
11. [d. at 62. In Perez, the Court, voting 5-4, upheld the constitutionality of section 
401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which provided for expatriation of a citizen who 
voted in a foreign political election. The Court expressly rejected the notion that a per-
son must "intend or desire" to lose his citizenship for that loss to occur. [d. at 6l. Sec-
tion 401 of the Nationality Act, and subsequent amendments, are subsumed in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1481 (1982). 
17
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Rusk,12 the Court overruled Perez, by holding that a citizen has 
a constitutional right to retain United States citizenship unless 
he voluntarily relinquishes it.I3 The Court grounded its opinion 
in the fourteenth amendment, which, it said, guarantees a citi-
zenship unassailable by any branch of government. 14 
In 1979, twelve years after Afroyim, Vance v. Terrazas I " ex-
panded upon the concept of voluntary relinquishment. IS The 
Terrazas Court held that loss of citizenship occurs when a citi-
zen, with intent to renounce, voluntarily performs a statutory 
expatriating act.I7 The Court clarified the scope of the prosecu-
tion's burden of proof in expatriation proceedings.I8 It was not 
enough, the Court elaborated, for the prosecution to show that a 
person has performed one of the congressionally designated ex-
patriating acts. To meet its burden of proof, the prosecution 
must also establish expatriative intent. IS The Terrazas Court 
next examined and resolved the confusion surrounding the 
proper evidentiary mechanisms in expatriation proceedings. 
12. 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
13. Id. at 268. Afroyim posed the question of whether, consistently with the four-
teenth amendment, Congress could enact a law which stripped one of United States citi-
zenship, though that citizenship had never been voluntarily renounced or given up. Id. at 
256. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, found section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940 
constitutionally infirm. The Court stated: "[IJn our country the people are sovereign and 
the government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their citizen-
ship." Id. at 257. See also 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969) (interpreting Afroyim). 
14. 387 U.S. at 262. 
15. 444 U.S. 252 (1979), reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980). 
16. The Court's consideration of section 1481 addressed two issues. The first was 
whether, under section 1481(a)(2), in establishing loss of citizenship by the taking of an 
oath of allegiance to a foreign state, the prosecution must prove an intent to surrender 
United States citizenship. The second issue concerned the standard of proof and the 
statutory presumption contained in section 1481(c). Specifically at issue was whether 
Congress had acted within its constitutional powers by legislating with respect to expa-
triation proceedings. 444 U.S. at 255. 
17. 444 U.S. at 261. Section 1481(a) lists seven expatriating acts. In addition to ob-
taining foreign naturalization and taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, see 
supra note 2, these acts are: serving in the armed services of a foreign state, serving in 
the government of a foreign state if it requires either naturalization or an oath of alle-
giance, formally renouncing United States citizenship before a United States diplomatic 
or consular official in a foreign state, making 8 formal renunciation of United States 
citizenship in the United States during a time of war, or committing treason against the 
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1982). 
18. Section 1481(c) places the burden of proof upon the person or party alleging the 
loss of citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1982). 
19. 444 U.S. at 268. 
18
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In the 1961 amendment of 8 U.S.C. § 1481,20 Congress had 
mandated a preponderance of the evidence as the requisite stan-
dard of proof.21 The Court declared that this standard was con-
stitutionally valid.22 It stated that a 1958 Supreme Court deci-
sion, Nishikawa u. Dulles,23 which had required proof by clear 
and convincing evidence,u was not constitutionally grounded.21i 
The 1961 amendment had also created a statutory presump-
tion that a statutory expatriating act is performed voluntarily. 
While the Terrazas Court found congressional authority to en-
act the presumption,28 it clearly stated that the scope of the pre-
sumption is limited to the issue of voluntariness. There is no 
presumption that an expatriating act is performed with the in-
tent to relinquish citizenship.27 
The Seventh Circuit interpreted the Terrazas precedent in 
the appeal of that case on remand from the Supreme Court.28 In 
Terrazas u. Haig,29 the Seventh Circuit held that appellant's 
knowing and understanding taking of an oath of allegiance to 
Mexico, together with an explicit renunciation of his United 
States citizenship, was a sufficient finding that he intended to 
relinquish his citizenship.30 Richards is the first expatriation 
20. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1481(c) (1982)). 
21. 444 U.S. at 264-65 & n.8 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 40 
(1961)). 
22. 444 U.S. at 266. The Court held that neither the citizenship clause nor the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment removed expatriation proceedings from the power 
to set evidentiary standards traditionally held by Congress. [d. 
23. 356 U.S. 129 (1958). Nishikawa concerned section 401(c) of the Nationality Act 
of 1940, which called for the expatriation of a United States citizen who served in the 
armed forces of a foreign country. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, 1168-
69. 
24. The Nishikawa Court noted that it was prescribing the evidentiary standard of 
proof in the absence of congressional guidance. 356 U.S. at 135. 
25. 444 U.S. at 266. 
26. [d. at 267-70. In Nishikawa, however, the Court had held that the government 
must establish that the military service was voluntary. The Nishikawa Court noted that 
this reversed the usual rule of evidence that voluntariness is presumed, and that one 
alleging the involuntariness of his own act must plead duress as an affirmative defense. 
356 U.S. at 139. But cf. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 269 & nn.10-11 (commenting on the much 
criticized Nishikawa opinion). 
27. 444 U.S. at 268. 
28. 444 U.S. 252 (1979), reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980), rev'd and remanded sub 
nom. Terrazas v. Haig, 653 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1981). 
29. Terrazas v. Haig, 653 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1981). 
30. [d. at 288. 
19
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case to reach the federal courts since the Terrazas opinions. 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that 
Richards had relinquished his citizenship.31 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit reviewed Richards's claims that he had 
performed the expatriating acts under duress and that he had 
lacked the intent to expatriate himself. 
Richards argued that he sought naturalization in Canada 
and took the mandatory oath of allegiance because he was co-
erced to do so for purposes of employment.32 The trial record 
showed, however, that when he decided to take the job with the 
Boy Scouts, Richards was and had been continuously employed 
as a school teacher.33 He did not contend that he was forced to 
leave his teaching position.34 Also, Richards was aware of the cit-
izenship requirement for the job with the Boy Scouts of Ca-
nada,311 and he did not argue that he had searched for a job 
which would have permitted him to retain his United States citi-
zenship.36 In addition, at the time he took the position with the 
Boy Scouts, he was unmarried and showed no evidence of press-
ing financial obligations.37 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
district court's holding that Richards was not under any eco-
nomic hardship, was not clearly erroneous.88 
The Ninth Circuit determined that the lower court was cor-
rect in stating that the Secretary of State must establish that 
performance of both the expatriating acts and the act or acts 
demonstrating intent to renounce United States citizenship, was 
31. 752 F.2d at 1423. 
32. [d. at 1419. The court agreed with the premise of Richards's argument that an 
expatriating act was not voluntary if performed under conditions of economic duress. [d. 
(citing Stipa v. Dulles, 233 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1956) ("dire economic plight and inability to 
obtain employment" influenced the alleged expatriate)); Insogna v. Dulles, 116 F. Supp. 
478 (D.D.C. 1953) (expatriating act performed to obtain money necessary "in order to 
live"). . 
33. 752 F.2d at 1419. 
34. [d. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. 
37. [d. at 1419-20. 
38. [d. at 1419. 
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voluntary.39 It found, however, that the lower court erred in de-
claring that the statutory presumption of voluntariness applies 
to both the expatriating acts and to those acts allegedly demon-
strating the actor's specific intent to renounce United States cit-
izenship.40 It stated that the statutory presumption of voluntari-
ness cannot apply to acts demonstrating expatriative intent 
because the Supreme Court, in Vance v. Terrazas, expressly 
held that there is no presumption of specific intent to relinquish 
citizenship.41 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit determined that the lower 
court's application of the presumption in Richards was not erro-
neous. The act which the Secretary of State alleged evidenced 
specific intent to relinquish United States citizenship, the re-
nunciation, was also an integral part of each of the expatriating 
acts, namely the naturalization and the oath of allegiance.42 The 
court reasoned that since the presumption of voluntariness ex-
tended to the expatriating acts, the presumption must necessa-
rily extend, in the instant case, to the act indicative of specific 
intent.43 
In reviewing Richards's argument that he lacked the requi-
site intent to renounce his citizenship because he never desired 
to give it up, the court explored the concept, enunciated in Ter-
razas, that expatriation turns upon the will of the citizen.·· It 
noted that Terrazas did not define the state of mind necessary 
to relinquish citizenship.411 The Ninth Circuit pointed out, how-
39. [d. at 1418. The court noted that showing the voluntariness of the act or acts 
which allegedly indicated specific intent to relinquish citizenship was a necessary part of 
establishing the element of intent. [d. 
40. [d. at 1418. 
41. [d. at 1419 (citing Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 268 (1979». 
42. [d. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 1420-21. The Terrazas Court held that although the citizen voluntarily 
performed one of the expatriating acts listed in § 1481{a), for loss of citizenship to occur, 
the act must be accompanied by an intent to terminate United States citizenship. 444 
U.S. at 263. The Ninth Circuit stated this rule in similar words, declaring that a citizen 
could effectively renounce United States citizenship only by an act which was meant to 
constitute a renunciation. 752 F.2d at 1420. The Ninth Circuit noted that it was not 
required to decide whether United States citizenship can effectively be renounced only 
through the performance of section 1481{a) acts, or whether other, "similarly formal" 
acts might result in loss of citizenship if performed with that intent. [d. 
45. 752 F.2d at 1420. Afroyim postulated that expatriation requires the citizen's "as-
sent." Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967). In Terrazas, the Court construed this 
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ever, that specific intent cannot be proved by merely showing 
that the actor knew that Congress has designated an act an ex-
patriating one.46 In fact, knowledge is irrelevant. A person who 
does not know that an act is an expatriating one, or even that 
expatriation is possible, might have the requisite intent.47 
Despite imprecision in the concept of expatriative intent, 
the court was clear that intent does not depend upon motiva-
tion. A United States citizen's free choice to renounce his citi-
zenship is effective whatever his motivation.48 Consequently, the 
court rejected Richards's theory that renunciation should be 
given effect only if motivated by a principled, abstract desire to 
sever allegiance to the United States.49 In no other context, the 
court noted, does the law refuse to give effect to a decision made 
knowingly and willingly simply because it was also made reluc-
tantly.llo The court determined that whenever a citizen has freely 
and knowingly renounced United States citizenship, his reasons 
for doing so for doing so· outweigh his desire to retain that 
citizenship. III 
"assent" to mean an intent to relinquish citizenship, whether "expressed in words" or 
"found as a fair inference from proved conduct." 444 U.S. at 260. 
46. 752 F.2d at 1421. The Afroyim Court clearly stated that Congress has no power 
to declare that the performance of particular acts results in expatriation. Afroyim v. 
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262·63 (1967). In Richards, the Ninth Circuit posed the question 
whether some acts may be so inherently inconsistent with a desire to retain United 
States citizenship that voluntary relinquishment may be inferred from them. 752 F.2d at 
1420 n.5 (citing Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 261 (1979) and Perez v. Brownell, 356 
U.S. 44, 62·84 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). The Ninth Circuit did not attempt to 
answer the question but did reconcile it with the Afroyim position. If loss of citizenship 
should occur in such a case, the court said, it would be a function of the inherent nature 
of the act, and not because Congress had designated it an expatriating one. 752 F.2d at 
1420. 
47. 752 F.2d at 1420·21. 
48. [d. at 1420. See also United States v. Lucienne D'Hotelle de Benitez Rexach, 
558 F.2d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1977) (expatriation to avoid liability for U.S. taxes); Jolley v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971) (expatriation to 
avoid military conscription). 
49. 752 F.2d at 1421. Richards argued that he lacked the requisite intent to expatri· 
ate himself because his sole motivation was career advancement. The court found his 
contention meritless. Specific intent was not lacking, the court said, merely because one 
sought to gain an important advantage he could not otherwise obtain. [d. 
50. [d. at 1421. The court reinforced its position: "[Tlhe right of expatriation is a 
natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." [d. at 1422 (quoting the Preamble to the Act 
of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223). 
51. 752 F.2d at 1421. 
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The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
voluntary taking of a formal oath which includes an express re-
nunciation of United States citizenship will ordinarily suffice to 
establish expatriative intent.1!2 Having determined that Richards 
presented no factors to justify a different result,1!3 the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's holding.l!· 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit's decision appears to scrupulously apply 
the precedents of Afroyim v. Ruskl!l! and Vance v. Terrazas:1!6 
expatriation results when a United States citizen voluntarily 
performs a statutory expatriating act, with the intent to relin-
quish that citizenship.1!7 Voluntariness is the first issue the 
Ninth Circuit considered. The court stated that even without 
the benefit of the presumption that an expatriating act is per-
formed voluntarily, the government had proven the voluntari-
ness of Richards' actions.1!8 This does not appear disputable, 
given Richards decision to accept a job which he knew required 
a change of citizenship, and his failure to show that adversity 
influenced that decision. Richards's sole claim was that a desire 
to advance his career had influenced him.1!9 
The court next examined the issue of specific intent. Fol-
lowing the district court's reasoning, the Ninth Circuit found the 
requisite intent60 in Richards's express renunciation of United 
States citizenship, which was included in the oath he signed at 
the time of his naturalization.6 } This finding is in direct accord 
with the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit in Terrazas v. Haig.62 
52.Id. 
53.Id. 
54. Id. at 1423. The court also declared that "under the circumstances of this case" 
the district court had not abused its discretion by refusing to consider Richards's consti-
tutional objection. Id. at 1422-23. 
55. 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
56. 444 U.S. 252 (1979), reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980). 
57. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17. 
58. 752 F.2d at 1419. 
59.Id. 
60. Id. at 1421. The court noted that Richards did not argue that he did not mean 
what he said when he signed the declaration of renunciation. Id. 
61. See supra note 3. 
62. 653 F.2d at 288. The Seventh Circuit recognized that rarely is direct evidence of 
expatriative intent available. Circumstantial evidence surrounding the commission of a 
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It should be noted, however, that Terrazas was specifically con-
cerned with a dual national's oath of allegiance to a country of 
which he was a citizen by birth. Although the decisions in Ter-
razas have been criticized63 because of the inequity which may 
be suffered by dual nationals, who, in swearing allegiance to a 
foreign sovereign, are merely attempting to preserve that citizen-
ship, Richards does not raise this troublesome issue. Richards 
was not a dual national,64 and so, given that renunciatory intent 
may be an integral part of an expatriating act, the case against 
him is much stronger. 
At this point, however, it may be useful to examine an oath 
of allegiance as an act clearly evincing renunciatory intent. One 
commentator notes a possible distinction between so-called dra-
matic oaths, which. include an express renunciation of a former 
allegiance, and dull oaths, which do not.65 It can be argued that 
an oath containing a renunciation would, at the least, put one on 
notice that citizenship might be lost. However, common sense 
rebels at categorizing oaths of this sort as being somehow more 
binding and, therefore, more probative of intent, than those 
which do not include a renunciation. In fact, some countries do 
not require that a person seeking naturalization must renounce a 
former allegiance.66 In the United States, by comparison, renun-
ciatory language is a part of the oath of allegiance administered 
in naturalization proceedings,67 and, until recently, this was also 
voluntary act of expatriation may establish the requisite intent to relinquish citizenship. 
Id. 
63. Dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court decision in Terrazas itself questioned 
the constitutional validity of 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) since the United States recognizes 
dual nationality. See 444 U.S. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 276 (Brennan, J. and 
Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Several commentators have expressed concern at the potentially harsh treatment 
which Terrazas metes dual nationals. See 3 Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law and 
Procedure, § 20.8(b)(4) (1984); Note, Vance v. Terrazas Expands the Erosion of the 
Equal Rights of Dual Nationals, 9 DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'y 265 (1980); Note, United 
States Loss of Citizenship After Terrazas: Decisions of the Board of Appellate Review, 
16 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L L. & POL. 829, 862 (1984); Note, Dual Nctionality and the Problem 
of Expatriation, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 291, 320 (1982). 
64. Richards's United States citizenship derives from the principle of jus soli, or 
right of birth. The United States also recognizes jus sanguinis, right of blood. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1401 (1982). 
65. Note, Acquisition of Foreign Citizenship: The Limits of Afroyim v. Rusk, 54 
CORNELL L. REV. 624, 631-32 (1969). 
66.Id. 
67. See 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1982). 
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true in Canada.68 
The question raised is whether the outcome of Richards 
would have been different had appellant sought naturalization in 
a country where a renunciation is not required. The search for 
an answer requires consideration of the Attorney General's 
Opinion interpreting Ajroyim,69 which was cited by the Terrazas 
Court.70 A meaningful oath, which might be either dull or dra-
matic, was considered to be highly persuasive of a citizen's in-
tent to transfer or abandon allegiance. Oaths which were not 
meaningful were distinguished.71 Moreover, circumstances sur-
rounding the oath-taking, including the citizen's acts and state-
ments at the time, were determinative factors.72 
After Terrazas, a State Department memorandum address-
ing the issue of expatriative intent'3 stressed that it is intent at 
the time of the commission of the act which must be ascer-
tained.74 Recognizing that no mechanical formula exists for this 
purpose, the State Department said that a proper determination 
of intent requires evaluation of the citizen's entire course of con-
duct.711 It suggested that an act accompanied by an express state-
ment of renunciation before foreign government officials was 
substantial evidence of intent to relinquish United States citi-
zenship.76 However, in some cases, a United States citizen might 
be naturalized in another country or take an oath of allegiance 
to a foreign nation without intending to renounce his United 
68. In 1973 the Canadian Federal Court rejected Canada's renunciatory oath as ul-
tra vires. The present oath of naturalization does not include a renunciation of former 
allegiance. Note, United States Loss of Citizenship After Terrazas: Decisions of the 
Board of Appellate Review, 16 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L L. & POL. at 864 & nn.247-48 (1984). 
69. 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969). 
70. 444 U.S. at 262-63 & n.6 (citing 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969); Department of 
State, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 224.4 at 2 (1970». 
71. See Duvall, supra note 9, at 438-43 (distinguishing cases in which an oath was 
not deemed to be expatriating). 
72. 444 U.S. at 262 n.6 (Citing Brief for Appellant at 57 n.28). 
73. Circular Airgram to all Diplomatic and Consular Posts, Aug. 27, 1980 (reprinted 
in Fed. Immigration L. Rep. (WSB) 11 17,523). 
74. Fed. Immigration L. Rep. (WSB) at 12-42. Subsequent acts may be probative of 
the citizen's state of mind at the time the expatriating act was performed, but may not 
be used to supply the requisite specific intent. [d. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. The State Department recognized that absent such a statement proof of in-
tent is more difficult. J d. 
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States citizenship." The State Department listed factors which 
were indicative of an intent not to renounce United States 
citizenship.78 
In Richards, the Ninth Circuit's analysis subscribes to a 
view of express renunciation similar to that of the State Depart-
ment. The court concluded that in the absence of mitigating cir-
cumstances, the finding that Richards's knowingly signed the 
oath of renunciation satisfied the burden of proof of the element 
of intent. 79 Though the court did not bolster its decision by cit-
ing Richards's actions following his naturalization in Canada, 
the factual statement recounts acts which the State Department· 
memorandum lists as corroborative of intent to relinquish citi-
zenship.80 Specifically, Richards travelled to the United States 
on a Canadian passport and registered for graduate study in 
California as a foreign student.81 Thereafter, on his second Ca-
nadian passport, he travelled to Ireland.82 
There is a danger inherent in conclusively finding expa-
triatory intent where naturalization or an oath of allegiance re-
quires a renunciation of a previous citizenship. When courts per-
mit evidence of intent to be established by the renunciation 
77. [d. 
78. [d. These included: statements, made immediately prior to or contemporane-
ously with the questioned act, that the actor considers himself to be a United States 
citizen and has no intention of relinquishing that citizenship; continued compliance with 
the obligations of United States citizenship such as filing tax returns and registering for 
military service; use of a United States passport; maintenance of a residence in the 
United States; voting in the United States; registering children born after the questioned 
act as United States citizens. [d. 
Compare factors indicating intent to relinquish United States citizenship: renuncia-
tory statements made in connection with the questioned act; surrender of passport or 
other documents evidencing United States citizenship to United States or foreign au-
thorities; denial of United States citizenship made in connection with tax returns, finan-
cial transactions, applications for employment or admission to educational institutions; 
exclusive use of a foreign passport; requesting a visa for foreign travel to the United 
States and/or entering on a foreign passport; failure to register as United States citizens 
children born subsequent to the questioned act, when children born previously were reg-
istered; failure to file tax returns, register for military service, or otherwise comply with 
the obligations of United States citizenship; membership in a political party or seeking 
public office in a foreign country; failure to maintain documentation of United States 
citizenship. [d. at 12-42 to 12-43. 
79. 752 F.2d at 1421. 
80. See supra note 78. 
81. 752 F.2d at 1412. 
82. [d. 
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included in, and therefore an integral part of, these statutory 
expatriating acts, the application of the presumption of volunta-
riness is extended. There is a bootstrapping effect: unless com-
plain ant successfully contests voluntary performance of the ex-
patriating acts, then not only is the element of intent 
established, but also the issue of voluntariness regarding it. An 
action of logic thus aids the government by circumventing part 
of its burden of proof against the person contesting expatriation. 
Courts must guard against potential abuse by carefully assessing 
the facts of each case, and avoid a perfunctory finding. that an 
express renunciation establishes intent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the language of the holding is broad, the Ninth 
Circuit exhibited no inclination to mechanically apply Vance v. 
Terrazas in reaching its decision in Richards. The court's care-
ful analysis of the facts dispels fear that Terrazas might en-
courage a hasty finding of expatriation under 8 U.S.C. § 
1481(a)(1) and (2) in cases where an express renunciation is an 
"integral" part of either act. 
The issue, not addressed by Richards, and which remains to 
be more fully litigated, concerns dual nationals. Where such per-
sons are required to make an oath of allegiance in order to exer-
cise the rights of an existing citizenship, it is hoped the courts 
will not be too quick to find expatriative intent. 
Jean Vieth* 
* Golden Gate U~iversity School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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SUMMARY 
NINTH CIRCUIT DEFINES A MEANINGFUL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL: RIDS-BERRIOS V. INS. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Rios-Berrios v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice; the Ninth Circuit held that the fifth amendment due pro-
cess clause2 and the Immigration and Nationality ActS assured 
an alien the right to legal counsel of his choice at deportation 
hearings. The court reversed a Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) decision which had both affirmed denial of asylum and 
determined that two continuances were "reasonable and suffi-
cient" to permit petitioner time to obtain counsel.4 The Ninth 
Circuit found that the petitioner had been prejudiced because 
the continuances together amounted to only two working days. II 
Rios-Berrios was arrested at San Ysidro, California on Jan-
uary 22, 1983, the day ,he entered the United States. He was an 
EI Salvadoran native who entered this country without inspec-
tion.a When apprehended, he was en route to Los Angeles where 
1. 776 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Chambers J.; other panel members were Tang, 
J. and Wiggins, J.) 
2. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
3. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 166 (1952) (codified 
as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982». 
4. 776 F.2d at 861. 
5. [d. at 862. 
6. [d. at 860, 861. 
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his son and his son's mother resided.7 Rios-Berrios was directed 
to appear at a processing center in Miami, Florida to show cause 
why he should not be deported.8 The order indicated, inter alia, 
that he had the right to be represented by counsel of his own 
choice.9 
The petitioner was taken into custody and transported to 
Florida where, on the following Friday, January 28th, his depor-
tation hearing commenced.10 At the hearing, petitioner asked for 
time to find a lawyer and the Immigration Judge continued the 
hearing for twenty-four hours, admonishing the petitioner that 
the hearing would go forward with or without counsel. 11 The 
next day, February 1, petitioner told the Immigration Judge that 
his friend had been in contact with counsel and a bail bondsman 
but that he had heard nothing from either of them. The Immi-
gration Judge continued the hearing for another twenty-four 
hours and again admonished Rios-Berrios that the hearing 
would commence.12 
At the hearing the following day, the petitioner appeared 
without counsel and the Immigration Judge did not inquire fur-
ther into petitioner's desire for counsel. 13 The Immigration 
Judge then took evidence and found Rios-Berrios deportable. 
Not wanting to be returned to EI Salvador, Rios-Berrios applied 
for asylum and the hearing was postponed until his application 
could be heard. 14 
Still without the aid of counsel, petitioner filed a timely ap-
plication for asylum. III He received an advisory opinion letter 
from the State Department which concluded that the applicant 
failed to establish a well-founded fear of being persecuted in EI 
7. Id. at 861-62. He had no other friends or relatives in the United States. Id. 
8. Id. at 860. 
9. Id. Rios-Berrios indicated that he wished to have bail redetermined. He signed a 
statement to expedite determination of his case by having an immediate hearing and 
waiving any right to more extended notice. Id. 
10. Id. It is not known if the petitioner was advised at that hearing of the right to 
counsel of his own choice or of the availability of free legal counsel. Id. at 860-61. 
11. Id. at 861. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
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Salvador.16 The deportation hearing was reconvened on March 
17,1983 where petitioner appeared in pro per; nothing was men-
tioned regarding his earlier wish to be represented by counseP7 
The Immigration Judge concluded that Rios-Berrios was not eli-
gible for asylum, but instructed him about the privilege of vol-
untary departure.18 Rios-Berrios informed the Immigration 
Judge that he felt he did not qualify for voluntary departure and 
chose instead to appeal the determination of deportability.19 
The petitioner was represented by counsel at his appeal to 
the BIA which affirmed the denial of asylum. The BIA held that 
two continuances were "reasonable and sufficient" to permit pe-
titioner time to obtain counsel and that his denial of voluntary 
departure was knowingly and intelligently made.20 Rios-Berrios 
then appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The primary authorities relied upon by the court were the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Barraza-Leon, the 
Supreme Court's decision in Ungar v. Sarafite, and sections 292 
and 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.21 
In Barraza-Leon, petitioner claimed that an earlier deporta-
tion order was invalid because he had been denied due process 
at that hearing.22 The court held that the fifth amendment guar-
antee of due process was applicable to an alien in a deportation 
hearing. 23 
16. [d. The State Department advisory opinion letter quoted the language of 8 
U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(42)(A)(1982) which articulates the meaning of refugee for purposes of 
qualifying for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1982). [d. at 861. 
17. 776 F.2d at 861. 
18. [d. In mid·June 1983, the petitioner secured his release from custody on bond. 
Appearing in the records, during this same time, was the first correspondence to Rios-
Berrios's attorney from a governmental official. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. The BIA relied on 8 C.F.R. § 242.13 (1985) which limits a petitioner to one 
continuance for the purpose of securing legal representation. 8 C.F.R. §" 242.13 (1985). 
21. United States v. Barraza·Leon, 575 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1978); Ungar v. Sarafite, 
376 U.S. 575 (1964); Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 292, 242(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1362, 
1252(b) (1982). 
22. 575 F.2d at 220. 
23. [d. 
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Because a deportation hearing is not a criminal matter, the 
alien is not entitled to an attorney at government expense under 
the sixth amendment,24 but both the due process clause and the 
Act require that the alien be entitled to counsel of his choice at 
his own expense. 211 Section 292 of the Immigration and National-
ity Act expressly states that in deportation proceedings, or in 
appeal proceedings therefrom, the petitioner has the privilege of 
being represented by counsel of his choice at no expense to the 
government.28 Section 242(b) of the Act further reiterates this 
point. Regulations require that the alien be notified of this right 
to counsel and be given a list of available free legal services at 
three unique times: when first served with the order to show 
cause; when served with the warrant; and at the deportation 
hearing.27 
The regulations that accompany the Act state that a contin-
uance to permit the petitioner to obtain counsel "shall not be 
granted more than once unless sufficient cause for the granting 
of more time is shown."28 In Ungar, petitioner challenged a 
judge's criminal contempt order. Ungar claimed that the denial 
of a continuance in that matter deprived him of his constitu-
tional right to engage counsel. 29 The Court recognized that the 
decision to grant or deny continuances was within the sole dis-
cretion of the judge and that his decision would not be over-
turned except upon a showing of clear abuse.30 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit relied on Ungar for the proposition that 
a violation of due process based on denial of a continuance must 
be found in the circumstances of each case as there is not an 
articulated test. 31 Addressing the facts, the court felt that it was 
an abuse of discretion for the Immigration Judge to allow con-
24. United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1975). 
25. 575 F.2d at 220. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 292, 242(b) (1952). 
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982). 
27. 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.l(c), 242.2, 242.16(a). References by the court to Title 8 were to 
those regulations revised as of January I, 1983. 776 F.2d at 862. 
28. 776 F.2d at 862. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.13. 
29. 376 U.S. at 576, 588-89. 
30. [d. at 589. 
31. 776 F.2d at 862 (citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964». 
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tinuances amounting to only two working days where the peti-
tioner was in custody, spoke only Spanish, had limited educa-
tion, was not familiar with this country and its legal procedures, 
and had been removed nearly 3,000 miles from his only friend in 
this country.32 
The court took note of the BIA's position under 8 C.F.R. § 
242.13. which limits the Immigration Judge's discretion to the 
granting of only one continuance, for the purpose of securing le-
gal counsel, absent a showing of sufficient cause for more time.33 
The court again stressed that the facts presented made "a mock-
ery of the clear statutory mandate that a person in petitioner's 
position has the right to counsel of his own choice."34 
In its appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service contended that the petitioner had waived 
the right to counsel at the February 2 hearing by not reiterating 
his request for legal representation.35 Because of the statutory 
and regulatory right to counsel granted to aliens and the Immi-
gration Judge's immediate taking of evidence at the February 2 
hearing, waiver was not found to be a tenable argument for the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.36 
The court neglected to decide whether denial of the right to 
counsel, if found to be a due process violation, requires a show-
ing of prejudice to the petitioner.37 The Ninth Circuit did find 
that, on the facts of this case, absence of counsel was clearly 
prejudicial to the petitioner on the matters of voluntary depar-
ture, asylum, and mandatory withholding of deportation.38 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit has clearly stated that the right to coun-
sel provided for by statute and agency regulation must be given 
32. 776 F.2d at 862-63. The court conceded that it was within the discretion of the 
Attorney General to transport Rios-Berrios from California to Florida under Title 8 of 
the /code of Federal Regulations, section 1252(c). 
33. 776 F.2d at 863. 
34.ld. 
35.ld. 
36.ld. 
37.ld. 
38. [d. 
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full force and effect. The court stressed that the fundamental 
issue of the right to counsel of one's choice would be carefully 
scrutinized in the future. When the petitioner is requesting relief 
predicated upon presentation of legal concepts, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has recognized the important role legal counsel plays in pro-
tecting an alien's due process rights. 
Maureen A. Monaghan* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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